

WAR WITHOUT END

AMERICAN
PLANNING
FOR THE NEXT
VIETNAM

MICHAEL T. KLARE

FOREWORD BY GABRIEL KOLB

ing inventories."²³ Among the items most frequently turned over to Latin American armies are jeeps, trucks, transport planes, river and coastal patrol boats, observation helicopters, and small arms. And while U.S. arms sales policies have been modified by the Nixon Administration, the MAP grant program is still aimed at improving the counterinsurgency capabilities of local forces. Thus MAP Director General Robert H. Warren told a Congressional committee in 1970 that the principal objective of the fiscal 1971 grant program was "to help Latin American nations maintain military and paramilitary forces capable of providing, with police forces, internal security essential to orderly political, social and economic development."²⁴

Between 1950 and 1969, the United States provided Latin American armies with arms, training, and services worth \$1,357 million. This amount includes \$725 million in MAP grants, "excess" defense articles valued at \$179 million, credit of \$253 million toward the purchase of American arms, and naval vessels worth \$200 million transferred under ship-loan legislation (see Appendix D). When the recipients of U.S. military assistance in Latin America are ranked by total aid received, it is apparent that the largest and most advanced countries are receiving the great bulk of such funds. (The one exception to this rule is Mexico, which for nationalistic reasons has traditionally shunned close military relations with the United States.) Thus Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, and Peru, which together account for about 60 percent of the gross national product of Latin America, received \$980 million in U.S. aid between 1950 and 1969, or 72 percent of the total MAP program in Latin America. When, however, these countries are ranked by the percentage of their total defense expenditures supplied by U.S. aid, a different pattern emerges. As can be seen in Table 7, the most favored Latin American recipients of U.S. aid, on a proportional basis, are the smaller and poorer nations of Central and South

Table 7
U.S. MILITARY AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF
LATIN AMERICAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
(In rank order; dollars in millions)

Total defense expenditures, cumulative, 1964-7 ^a		U.S. military aid, cumulative, fiscal 1964-7 ^b		U.S. aid as a percentage of total defense expenditures	
Country	Amount	Country	Amount	Country	Percentage
Brazil	2,380	Brazil	50.3	Panama	32.5
Argentina	843	Peru	35.9	Bolivia	21.9
Venezuela	712	Colombia	31.2	Uruguay	18.0
Peru	367	Chile	31.1	Paraguay	17.0
Chile	321	Argentina	22.6	Ecuador	16.0
Colombia	302	Ecuador	16.0	Honduras	12.9
Dominican Rep.	133	Bolivia	12.5	Guatemala	12.5
Ecuador	100	Uruguay	9.2	Colombia	10.2
Bolivia	57	Dominican Rep.	8.4	Peru	9.8
Guatemala	56	Guatemala	7.0	Chile	9.7
Uruguay	51	Paraguay	5.1	El Salvador	9.0
El Salvador	38	Venezuela	4.8	Dominican Rep.	6.3
Paraguay	30	Honduras	3.5	Argentina	2.7
Honduras	27	El Salvador	3.4	Brazil	2.1
Panama	4	Panama	1.3	Venezuela	0.6

^a Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures 1969* (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 18.

^b Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance Facts* (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 16-19. (Includes grants and excess defense articles only.)

America. Not surprisingly, many of the proportionally largest handouts have gone to countries that have experienced guerrilla uprisings in the past decade—Bolivia, Panama, Uruguay, Guatemala.

Although the U.S. aid program has never constituted more than 5 percent of Latin America's annual defense expenditures (which, if Cuba is excluded, amounted to \$2 billion in 1968), such assistance has accounted for as much as 50 percent of what the larger countries spend on arms acquisitions, and up to 90 percent of what many of the