

PROSPECT FOR

AMERICA

The problems and opportunities
confronting American democracy—in foreign
policy, in military preparedness,
in education, in social and economic affairs.

THE
ROCKEFELLER PANEL
REPORTS

economic institutions be kept flexible so as not to risk making present divisions seem permanent.

Political and economic unity must, finally, be matched in the field of a European defense system. When the establishment of the European Defense Community was being debated, the United States was well aware of this need. The fact that those efforts proved abortive then should not blind us now to the necessity of exploring new possibilities in existing circumstances.

The NATO states can make their military contribution by providing a powerful and versatile defense organization, combined with a strong will to resist aggression in whatever form it occurs. In this posture lies the best assurance of peace and continued freedom. As and when continental Western Europe secures for itself atomic weapons, its statesmen will be faced with heavy responsibility to organize these weapons within the overall defenses of the Atlantic community—not succumbing to the temptation to duplicate the categories in which the United States is concentrating its major effort. Rather, in the common interest it must be hoped it will use its new weapons to increase its capacity to resist aggression against its own territory.

Assuming Europe will possess atomic arms, it would seem desirable that it create an atomic pool that will complement other forms of European co-operation.

Increasing European unity and strength might be criticized as a step toward greater divergence between United States and European policy. Adjustments will undoubtedly be needed as such a partnership takes shape. However, true Atlantic unity can best be fostered by the growing cohesion and integration of Europe. The Atlantic community must be one that has in it nothing of subordination or inequality. It must be a regional grouping with shared responsibilities, continuous consultation, and joint decision making.

THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMUNITY

Equally important is the other great region of which the United States is a part—that of the Western Hemisphere, with Canada and Latin America forming with ourselves the major components. Canada is actually a kind of hinge between the two regional systems. Its position in the North Atlantic and its Common-

wealth ties link it with Great Britain and thence with the continent. The sharing of interests and ideals with the United States makes for a relationship far more intimate than one based on mere physical proximity. A long history of amicable dealings and the famous example of the unguarded border speak for bonds of a unique kind. These are reinforced by strategic considerations in a day when the most likely route of attack upon this continent is over the top of the world, across the pole. The fact that there have been economic difficulties between the United States and Canada in recent years emphasizes the need for close consultation on all common matters. There must be a genuine concern for the interests of a neighbor that has its own aspirations and has already shouldered at least its full share of responsibility in world tasks.

More complex is the problem in community building presented by twenty countries to the south of the United States. Their importance cannot be overestimated. Here is a population already larger than the population of the United States and expanding at a faster rate. Here is a trade roughly equal to our trade with Europe. Here are natural resources that offer enormous fields for development.

The countries of Central and South America provide a field of constructive action by which the claims of the United States to world leadership may well be judged. If Soviet strategy sets the breakup of the Atlantic community at the top of its political agenda, there is no question but that it is working hard to divide the United States from its Latin American neighbors.

Unlike Europe and even Asia, our opportunities in regard to the Western Hemisphere have failed to evoke the continuous interest of the American people. Too often Latin American relations have been handled absent-mindedly until some incident or crisis compelled attention.

This has not always been so. The Monroe Doctrine was an act of far-reaching creative statesmanship that should have set the stage for a continuous and enlarging preoccupation of the United States with this area. In raising a bulwark against colonial ventures in the southern continent, American statesmen established the enduring pattern of our interests and involvement. In the nineteenth century they sealed off the vast inter-American area against the kind of intrusion which in that period made an imperial patch-

work of Africa, and they kept the way free for development in the Americas of independent self-governing nations. At the same time, perhaps building better than they knew, they developed a triple Latin American-United States-European relationship. Great Britain's support of Monroe's declaration found an echo in 1941-45, when all the Central and South American countries declared war against Hitler's Germany.

The Organization of American States is the longest established regional group of the modern world. It provides a valuable example of how regional peace-keeping systems stand as a sub-structure basic to the court of last resort represented by the United Nations. The place of the United States within the OAS puts our policy and our diplomacy to the test in acting vigorously, with intimate knowledge of complex trends and changing personalities, while maintaining the respect for independence that a system of self-governing units requires.

The United States must join in creating a viable economic and political order for the southern continent adequate to meet the sweeping social changes that are clearly needed, and for a continuously expanding economic system. The United States must be prepared to make a contribution that is large, sustained, and well-planned. Such a contribution, needless to say, can be made only on the basis of organized and effective efforts within Latin America itself. If we on our side have the need for more constructive action, it needs to be said that the leaders of the South American countries have tasks of their own to face up to.

In another report in this series, *Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century*, the panel urges steps toward a common market in Latin America; workable procedures for moderating extreme price fluctuations in basic commodities; ways for the co-operative promotion of general economic growth and development; establishment of an Inter-American Payments Union; and steps toward greater co-operation in social objectives, in education, low-cost housing, health, and technical assistance.

These objectives, spelled out in detail in the other report, the panel considers basic prerequisites to the development of a full community of interests and to general well-being within the hemisphere. The organization of the Inter-American Development Bank is an important step forward, but we urge once more thoughtful consideration of the whole range of recommendations.

In addition, the United States should take a sympathetic interest in regional discussions among the Central American states for common action in economic, education, health, and other matters. Yet even if these objectives were all achieved, the task in this hemisphere would not be completed.

Beyond everything that statesmanship and economics can accomplish there must be an effort of the intellect and of the spirit to comprehend what is going on in the depths of this complex area, to sort out the elements that create a common denominator between so many disparate national strivings, and to build on these for the long future. Latin America is passing through a period of intense cultural activity. In the exchange of scholars, scientists, and literary figures, one sees evidence of a groping for the things that shall bring the whole Latin American civilization to a new level of self-conscious unity.

The United States cannot hope to play in the life of the continent the role that its position should justify, and that incidentally its own position and well-being require, unless it can put itself in tune with the political and cultural movements. Latin America, despite some setbacks and diversions, appears to be building toward new forms of regional international organization, and its leaders want North Americans to think with them. Genuine understanding is needed. This kind of understanding is not achieved without effort or sustained without attention, but in the final analysis it may be no less important than economic support.

THE UNITED NATIONS

In addition to participating directly in the development of two regional groups, the United States has participated fully and from the start in the United Nations, the international organization that today holds out the reasonable hope of being able to take over more and more functions and to assume increasingly large responsibilities. In supporting the spirit and letter of the Charter, the United States has shown that it gives more than lip service to the indispensable world order that, as we have seen, is basic to the American consensus. The UN is proof of our conviction that problems which are of world-wide impact must be dealt with through institutions global in their scope. It should stand as one

of the principal vehicles through which our foreign policy is expressed.

The United Nations plays a vitally important role in the development of a functioning international system. Through its role in the emergence of new nations, it has helped to keep a world order which is dynamic, yet peaceful, and hospitable to forces of change and growth. In many aspects of life, nationalistic rivalries must give way before a common world need, and these are now being dealt with by the specialized agencies of the UN. They include, among others, health, children's welfare, cultural activities, and agricultural research. This part of the UN's work, too often unnoticed because it is non-controversial, needs to be fully developed. New areas of common interest need to be constantly defined and to be implemented at the international level.

The United States should be anxious, in particular, to make additional use of the UN in its approach to economic aid. International agencies for economic and technical assistance and training can bring dividends far more significant than the gratitude that a single contributor of economic aid may expect—but rarely gets—from the recipient country. Drawing the United Nations into economic development helps to mobilize the capacities of other countries in fields where the United States does not have the experience or skill to do the job alone. Participation by the Soviet Union in these activities may make a real contribution toward bridging over the chasm that separates the two ideological systems.

The UN, besides, gives to international diplomacy a field of operations that at certain junctures can be of crucial importance. The expanding role of the Secretary General puts at the disposition of the nations an international civil servant of high prestige whose disinterestedness and skill are highly beneficial to all. In the complex and continuing negotiations that must go on for years in such an area as disarmament, many approaches, many occasions and personalities must be available. The scene must shift; bilateral and multilateral talks can be expected to succeed one another. One of the great objectives must be to keep hope alive and the possibilities of discussion open. In this involved process the UN with its international staff can make a major contribution. Its watchfulness, its experience, its increasing an-

embodiment of expert knowledge and skills make this field hard to overestimate. and, finally, as a symbol of the world order that will one day be built. The United States has need of symbols as well as power in its foreign policy. To measure the UN's contribution, one need only ask how much meaner and poorer, how much less touched by hope or reason would be the world scene if it suddenly ceased to exist.

THE NATURE OF ORDER IN THE WORLD

This experience of the United States in regional groupings and in the world organization gives substance to its image of an ideal world. As Americans, we are not talking of things that we have not known at first hand. Imperfect as we recognize these beginnings to be, we see in them the possibility of a development that can immensely benefit men and nations over wide areas of the globe. On the basis of this still fragmentary knowledge, we can generalize; perhaps we can even predict.

Let us try, then, to state briefly what this panel has in mind when it speaks of the opportunity before America of helping to shape a new world order. The phrase could easily be misunderstood. It could be taken as meaning a *Pax Americana*: an imperial ambition to call nations into being, to set them against one another in a balance of power, to divide and break up any too massive concert. We do not have that in mind. Nor do we have in mind, as could conceivably be supposed, spreading American ways of doing things across the globe, hoping to duplicate elsewhere the particular kind of life that now exists within the boundaries of the United States.

This panel thinks, rather, of an order in the world that makes it possible for all nations to develop, to create conditions in which their citizens can have the fullest opportunity for self-realization and self-fulfillment, where every kind of humane aspiration can reach the light. The steady rise in living standards, with the gradual abolition of poverty in all countries, is one element of this order. So is the growth of a wide complex of institutions, which makes it possible for citizens of all countries to deal freely with one another, to move about without hindrance, to conduct their affairs with a minimum of frustration and heat.

The highest expression of such an order is a sense that all men are brothers, deeply concerned in each other's fate. Next to that is a kind of neighborliness, which makes it possible for men and women from anywhere in the world to talk with each other civilly, not unduly impressed by differences between them nor overly anxious that all should speak in the same accents.

The instrument through which this order is to be achieved can perhaps best be described as Law. International law has its part to play, and its rapid development would be one unmistakably hopeful sign. If governments can agree to submit more and more of their difficulties to adjudication before the World Court, this would be a mark of significant progress.

We also think of law in a much broader sense, as recognized custom, as accepted ways of dealing with one another, as the slow accretion of consent and accord. Law in this sense can arise where men come to know one another well and manage their joint affairs with instinctive confidence. It can arise in agencies of the international body or wherever officials of various nations gather to accomplish some agreed-on purpose. It will sometimes be codified and made explicit. More often it will exist in shared understandings and tacit approvals. It will usually not be enforceable in any strict legal sense, but it will live and grow because nations recognize increasingly that the things that need to be done in the world can only be accomplished where men bear and forbear within broad limits set by their common experience.

This kind of order, we submit, is compatible with the basic American character. Tentative and experimental as its development must be, such an order offers the best hope of a world in which the potentialities of the twentieth century can be realized for the benefit of all.

IV. The Communist Threat

The American objective of a global community at peace confronts the world as it actually exists, with its ideological conflicts, its propagandas, its economic inequalities, and its menacing arms race. The goal as we have described it in preceding sections can be sought only by taking these into account. Coming thus from a statement of the ideal to a consideration of actual circumstances, we cannot but be conscious of a descent from uncluttered space into an atmosphere full of troubles and ambiguities.

Yet that is no reason either to despair of the ultimate goal or to lack resolution for facing immediate necessities. Foreign policy, especially in such an age as ours, must be carried on with a two-fold sense of time. There are things that must be done in the present—and nothing should cause the prudent statesman to defer them; there are other things that must wait. Time gained can, if we use it well, provide an opportunity for the working out of slowly maturing forces that can transform the world scene and perhaps bring mankind back from the abyss into which it now peers.

The great and immediate threat is posed, obviously, by the Communist rulers of Russia and China. There are other problems in the world, to be sure. In certain areas where Soviet influence has been felt only indirectly and at the fringes, the problems have been complex and are often still unsolved. In the Middle East for a full decade after World War II, the United States and Britain, despite similar fundamental interests, were unable to effectuate any broad settlement. Nationalistic fervors, technological developments, racial and religious animosities, and economic revolutions—these, quite apart from communism, put Western policy makers to the test. So it is and has been elsewhere in the world.